An empirical analysis of the curvilinear relationship between slack and firm performance by Argilés Bosch, Josep M. et al.
1 
 
Title: An empirical analysis on the curvilinear relationship between 
slack and firm performance 
 
Authors: 
Josep Mª Argilés-Bosch 
Universitat de Barcelona (Departament d’Empresa) 
Josep Garcia-Blandón* 
IQS, (Faculty of Economics) 
Diego Ravenda 
Toulouse Business School (Department of Management Control, 
Accounting and Auditing) 
Mónica Martínez-Blasco*** 
IQS, (Faculty of Economics) 
 
Address for correspondence: 
Josep Mª. Argilés. Department of Accounting. Facultat d’Econòmiques i 
Empresarials. Universitat de Barcelona. Av. Diagonal, 696. 08034 Barcelona. Spain. 
Phone:  00 34 93 4039985 
  00 34 93 4021957 
Fax.   00 34 93 4029099 
e-mail address:  josep.argiles@ub.edu 
* e-mail address: josep.garcia@iqs.edu 
** e-mail address: dravenda@hotmail.com 




An empirical analysis of the curvilinear relationship between slack and 
firm performance  
 
Abstract 
This study performs an in-depth analysis of the curvilinear relationship between slack and 
future firm performance. Using a sample of US firms, we analyze the influence of three 
indicators of absorbed and unabsorbed slack on the two commonest dimensions of firm 
performance: profitability and sales growth. Although the relationship between most 
slack variables and firm performance is curvilinear, the inflection points (for both 
maximums and minimums) lie mainly outside the distribution range of the slack variables 
and, consequently, the curvilinear relationships between slack and performance are, in 
fact, neither U-shaped nor inverted U-shaped. Therefore, the influence of slack on 
performance can be positive or negative: linear for certain variables, but concave/convex 
for most variables analyzed in our study. An additional important finding is that the 
influence of slack on future profitability is usually the opposite of its influence on future 
sales growth: negative and positive, respectively, for absorbed slack; positive and 
negative, respectively, for financial slack. Results are robust to different lagged periods 
of the independent variables. The effects of equity and cash slacks on future performance 
are mainly negative, especially for longer time periods. 
 
 







Cyert and March (1956, p. 52) defined slack as a pool of excess resources that helps 
firms to adjust to unexpected fluctuations. Similarly, Bourgeois (1981) stated that slack 
is a cushion of actual and potential resources that firms can use to adapt to internal and 
external pressures, counteract threats and exploit opportunities. Slack resources, as such, 
provide protection against unfavorable events, like an economic downturn (Zona, 2012). 
One line of empirical research with regard to this issue analyzes the influence of different 
measures of slack on firm profitability, as is apparent in the review conducted by Daniel 
et al. (2004). These authors conclude that extant empirical research finds different effects 
of slack on firm performance. The literature on slack, however, holds that firms need 
surplus resources to build the necessary capacities to achieve an advantageous 
competitive position, as well as to avoid waste and maintain a favorable financial 
performance.  
While firm performance has many dimensions, empirical research on slack has tended 
to focus on a sole dimension of performance, typically profitability. Given that 
profitability and growth can be deemed different, if not even opposite and conflicting, 
dimensions of performance and strategic objectives (e.g. Peteraf and Barney, 2003; 
Markman and Gratner, 2002; Armstrong and Green, 2007), the absence of analysis of the 
influence of slack on the two is a remarkable deficiency in the extant literature. 
Some studies (Bromiley, 1991; Tan and Peng, 2003; Tan, 2003; George, 2005; Chiu 
and Liaw, 2009; Modi and Mishra, 2011; Tan and Wang, 2010) have tested the curvilinear 
relationship between slack and performance. And where they found significant 
coefficients for the slack variables and their squared terms, they concluded in favor of the 
existence of U-shaped or inverted U-shaped relationships (mainly the latter) and, 
therefore, of optimal points. Bradley et al. (2011a) observed concave and convex 
relationships, but these authors focused more closely on interactions of slack with 
munificence and dynamism and did not perform in-depth analyses of squared terms of 
slack. Salge and Vera (2013) found no significant coefficient for the squared slack 
variable and, consequently, could find no support for the hypothesis of an inverted U-
shaped relationship. However, apart from a significant sign for the coefficient of the 
squared variable, additional conditions are required. The maximum or minimum points 
should lie within the data range of the variable, and not too close to an endpoint of the 
data range, and tests should be performed for the slopes of the lower and upper bounds of 
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the variable’s range (Lind and Mehlum, 2010). These authors review a number of studies 
published in leading economics journals, concluding that they do not use adequate 
procedures when testing for the presence of a U-shape, or inverted U-shape but, generally, 
report only the significance of the quadratic term, which is potentially misleading.  
To our knowledge, no previous study has performed such an in-depth analysis of the 
existence of U-shaped or inverted U-shaped relationships between slack and 
performance. Hence, there are no reliable conclusions regarding precise levels of 
attainable and affordable slack leading to either maximum or minimum future 
performance, in the extant business literature. The identification of an optimal level of 
slack would provide valuable knowledge for both academics and practitioners, and would 
be an invaluable mechanism for improving firm efficiency and resource use. Managers 
would have a straightforward and clear means for attaining their targets, and academics 
would be able to cast light on the appropriate determinants and the most efficient ways of 
attaining them. It is of interest to both practitioner and academic to investigate the 
dilemma of the existence of a desirable level of slack and/or a positive/negative 
relationship between that level and performance. As researchers commonly mimic 
previous procedures, it is important to call into question any conclusions hastily drawn 
from estimates of quadratic terms. An inappropriate assessment of the existence of critical 
thresholds of slack may provide misleading guidance for managers, investors and other 
classes of practitioner and stakeholder, as well as forming a groundless foundation upon 
which to build knowledge on this matter.  
This study contributes in-depth analyses of the curvilinear relationships between a 
wide array of slack variables and two different performance dimensions: profitability and 
growth. It provides evidence of the fact that the lack of rigorous analysis of these 
relationships may lead to misleading conclusions in business research; more precisely, it 
shows that there are no plausible levels of slack facilitating maximum or minimum 
performance. It also contributes to the few existing studies on the influence of slack on 
sales growth. Finally, to our knowledge, it is the first empirical research to analyze, in a 
single study, the influence of slack on two different dimensions of firm performance, 
namely profitability and sales growth, dimensions that are usually considered to be 
conflicting strategic choices. In this respect, we contribute evidence of opposing 
influences of slack on profitability and growth to existing research.  
We report the existence of curvilinear relationships between most of the slack 
measures analyzed and future performance, but the corresponding maximum or minimum 
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points lie outside the distribution range of the slack variables. We show that simply 
reporting the significant sign of the squared slack variable, as has been frequent in the 
literature, is misleading when assessing the existence of U-shaped or inverted U-shaped 
relationships. According to our evidence, the influence of slack on performance can be 
positive or negative, depending on the type of slack and performance. There are no 
attainable maximum or minimum points of performance. We find opposing influences of 
absorbed slack on profitability and sales growth: negative on the former and positive on 
the latter. While increasing levels of absorbed slack are associated with lower levels of 
future profitability, and with higher levels of sales growth. These results are robust to 
different forward periods considered. With respect to unabsorbed slack, the influence of 
financial slack is positive on profitability and negative on sales growth. The influences of 
equity and cash slacks on performance are mainly negative. Most of the results reported 
are also robust to different forward periods considered for slack. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows: the next section explains the research 
background, we then describe the research design and sample characteristics, and present 
our results. We end with a discussion and our concluding remarks. 
 
 
2 Theoretical background 
Methodologies, approaches and results vary considerably across the studies included 
in the meta-analysis conducted by Daniel et al. (2004) of the influence of slack on firm 
performance, as they do across more recent studies – see Table 1 for a summary.  
 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 approximately here 
------------------------------------------ 
 
Yet, while firm performance is multi-dimensional, almost all empirical studies of the 
effects of slack on it focus on a sole dimension. Moreover, some studies analyze the 
influence of slack on somewhat unusual performance measures, built from responses to 
questionnaires. For instance, Voss et al. (2008) analyze the effects on product exploration 
and exploitation, Mellahi and Wilkinson (2010) on the number of patents issued, Elbanna 
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(2012) on organizational performance, Huang and Li (2012) on project performance, 
Salge and Vera (2013) on learning capability and organizational performance, and Su et 
al. (2011) on a composite index built from responses in five categories: growth, 
profitability, quality, service and overall performance.  
However, profitability and sales growth are the most common dimensions and 
measures of firm performance, and they are shown to interact and evolve in complex, 
multidimensional ways (Steffens et al., 2009). The most frequent argument made for 
establishing a link between them is that growth results in a greater size, which, in turn, 
fosters economies of scale and scope, first mover advantages and network externalities 
(Davidsson et al., 2009; Bercovitz and Mitchell, 2007). Szymanski et al. (1993) argue that 
common sources of sales growth may drive economic benefits, but that they may also 
bring greater costs, with uncertain effects on profitability. Some authors present growth 
and profitability as different and even as opposite and conflicting strategic objectives (e.g. 
Peteraf and Barney, 2003; Markman and Gartner, 2002; Armstrong and Green, 2007). 
While most existing research analyzes the effects of slack on different measures of 
profitability (e.g. Tan and Peng, 2003; Tan, 2003; Love and Nohria, 2005; Peng et al., 
2010; Modi and Mishra, 2011; Lecuona and Reitzig, 2014; Vanacker et al., 2013), to our 
knowledge only Mishina et al. (2004) and Bradley et al. (2011a) analyze its influence on 
sales growth. Given that firms may have one or both strategic objectives (often considered 
as opposites), or they may seek to balance them, a complete analysis requires considering 
the impact of slack on both measures of performance. 
Most previous research classifies slack according to its discretional managerial use 
(e.g. George, 2005; Bradley et al. 2011a, 2011b). Accordingly, a commonly established 
distinction between absorbed and unabsorbed slack (e.g. Tan and Peng, 2003; Huang and 
Li, 2012) refers to excess costs in organizations with low discretional use, and to 
uncommitted resources allowing greater managerial discretion, respectively. The 
discussion concerning the influence of slack does not usually distinguish between 
absorbed and unabsorbed varieties. While organizational theory argues that slack 
resources, in general, have a positive effect on firm performance, agency theory identifies 
a negative influence (Tan and Peng, 2003; Daniel et al., 2004; George, 2005). Extant 
knowledge here is inconclusive with respect to the sign of the effect of different types of 
slack on performance, and also with respect to the level of slack at which firms achieve 
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optimal performance. However, it seems that absorbed slack may provide a buffer, or a 
pool of resources, allowing for the exploitation of opportunities or exploration of potential 
market requirements, thus enabling growth but also likely jeopardizing profitability. For 
instance, the existence of excess inventories, machinery or equipment may help to fuel 
immediate future sales or facilitate expansion plans, ensuring the supply of growing or 
new market demands. However, these surplus resources may be a burden on a firm’s 
profitability. Similarly, the endowment of a large staff of qualified employees or senior 
officers may help to build strategies leading to future business growth, but may, in turn, 
prove to be a burden on a firm’s profitability, even over the long term. Given that 
unabsorbed slack, including financial slack and cash reserves, allows for a wider array of 
potential and discretional uses, it may have more uncertain effects on a firm’s profitability 
and growth. 
The main concern of this study is to analyze the existence or otherwise of U-shaped or 
inverted U-shaped relationships between slack and performance. Extant research is 
inconclusive on this question, regarding both the arguments underpinning such 
relationships and the empirical findings. 
With respect to the inverted U-shaped relationship, various authors have argued for 
(and found) the existence of this relationship, concluding that a moderate level of slack 
provides for optimal performance (e.g. George, 2005; Tan and Peng, 2003; Tan and 
Wang, 2010; Chiu and Liaw, 2009). There are a number of plausible explanations as to 
why this might be the case. On the one hand, from the point of view of organizational 
theory, slack enhances experimentation, risk taking, innovativeness, building capabilities, 
etc. It also eases capital restrictions and strategic choices. Therefore, an increase in slack 
is associated with a subsequent increase in performance. However, at higher levels of 
slack, the behavior recognized by agency theory prevails. Managers become complacent 
and engage in irrational decision-taking, including excessive diversification or 
managerial empire building (e.g. Cooper et al., 1988; Hope and Thomas, 2008). When 
managers have been engaged in successful and/or ongoing projects and courses of action, 
they lose any perception of threat and fail to change their resource investment patterns 
and organizational processes (Gilbert, 2005). For example, an excessive endowment of 
staff, employees and other selling, general and administrative resources may result in a 
less alert or dedicated management, who behave complacently. Such a response is likely 
to be even more pronounced when financial resources are plentiful. The excessive 
8 
 
abundance of such resources is a burden undermining a firm’s performance, both in 
absolute and relative terms. Hvide and Møen (2010) found empirical evidence of this 
relationship between wealth and returns on equity. 
According to Nohria and Gulati (1996), two underlying mechanisms are activated. On 
the one hand, too little slack discourages any type of experimentation where success is 
uncertain, while a certain amount of slack promotes greater risk taking, experimentation 
and the undertaking of new projects. Slack also frees up managerial attention, a scarce 
resource that cannot be exploited when levels of slack are low. On the other hand, slack 
promotes diminishing levels of discipline. As slack increases, the discipline exercised in 
the selection, ongoing support, and termination of projects becomes lax, with the result 
that inappropriate projects may be initiated and developed. Moreover, managers tend to 
become less demanding about reaching certain targets. For example, a surplus of 
shareholder or cash funds may help to fuel expansion plans or new projects, but beyond 
a certain level it may equally breed complacency and a lack of discipline, resulting in the 
implementation of unsuitable projects or a deterioration in the rigor with which good 
projects already underway are pursued. These countervailing forces describe an inverted 
U-shaped relationship with performance, suggesting that perhaps an intermediate level of 
slack is optimal. Likewise, increasing levels of inventories and equipment will allow sales 
growth, but on reaching a certain point they will begin to compete with the resources 
needed to start new projects and will become detrimental to growth. In the same vein, 
Salge and Vera (2011) argue that once this turning point has been reached, excessive slack 
can be expected to drive inertia, which in its turn jeopardizes performance. 
In the case of arguments identifying a U-shaped relationship, a lack of slack may force 
a company to manage projects with greater care and efficiency (Baker and Nelson, 2005) 
and, in this way, achieve a good performance. Likewise, as a firm’s wealth begins to 
increase it may feel less impelled to strive for efficient use, explore new possibilities and 
make proactive choices. In contrast, a firm with little slack, and especially with limited 
financial resources, is forced to try out new ideas, enhance innovation, make proactive 
choices, overcome scarcity and, therefore, improve its performance. Yet, firms with slack 
above a certain level, while under no obligation to innovate, are in a better position to 
build capabilities and implement the decisions needed to improve performance. Bromiley 
(1991) argues that when slack corresponds to the firm’s target level (as determined by its 
aspirations), it takes few risks, because they consider the organization to be operating 
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satisfactorily and so it adheres to conventional routines. But at levels below and above 
this target slack, managers are more forced, willing or able to take risks. This means slack 
should have a non-linear influence on performance, with both high and low levels of slack 
being associated with higher levels of performance than those associated with more 
moderate levels of slack. Another plausible explanation is that at low resource levels, all 
available resources must be assigned to either operational or urgent tasks. The first 
increases in slack merely burden financial performance, as the incremental investment 
required by these additional resources is not adequately rewarded with future additional 
income, thus decreasing performance in relative terms. While efforts are focused on 
operational activities, they cannot be transferred to value-added activities. In such 
situations, a firm’s dynamics are unable to perform well, because strategic and planning 
activities are constantly being postponed in order to run daily operations, and any 
available resources, however valuable or qualified, must be implemented to ensure short-
run operations and to deal with disruptions caused by unexpected events. For instance, 
Argilés et al. (2014) found empirical evidence that labor accidents contribute to 
decreasing long-term profitability, suggesting that the disruptions caused by these 
accidents take up managerial slack, diverting managerial attention and strategic activities 
into ensuring restoration of daily operative tasks. There is a large body of empirical 
evidence pointing to the beneficial effects of planning on performance (e.g. Delmar and 
Shane, 2003; Brinckmann et al., 2010; Kim and Sung-Choon, 2013), but there are few 
options for developing planning and strategic behaviors when slack is scarce. Only when 
a certain level of slack is achieved can managers focus on strategy and planning and 
devote sufficient time to these activities. Thus, it is only at levels above this that slack 
fuels future performance through the implementation of value-added decisions. 
Consequently, when slack is scarce the effect of any incremental expansion of resources 
is a decrease in performance, but above a moderate level of slack, firm performance 
increases as a result of proactive management decisions and new capabilities being put 
into action. This may be the influence of staff, employees and other selling, general and 
administrative resources on future sales growth. While Bromiley (1991) failed to find 
empirical evidence of a U-shaped relationship between slack and performance, Chiu and 
Liaw (2009) claimed to find such a relationship between recoverable slack and 
performance, as well as an inverted U-shaped relationship between both available and 
potential slack and two out of their three measures of performance. 
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Next, we explain the methodology used to test empirically the existence of hump-
shaped or U-shaped relationships between slack and performance. 
 
 
3 Research design 
3.1  Empirical model 
In this study we analyze the existence of U-shaped or inverted U-shaped relationships 
between a wide array of slack indicators and two different dimensions of firm 
performance: profitability and sales growth. To do so, we use two equations. Equation 1 
analyzes the effects of slack on firm profitability (PR). It formulates future firm 
profitability depending on different indicators of slack (SL), while controlling also for 
sales growth, size and specific seasonal or temporal effects: 
𝑃𝑅 , = 𝛼 + 𝛼 ∙ 𝑆𝐿 , + 𝛼 ∙
𝑆 ,
𝑆 ,
+ 𝛼 ∙ log𝐴𝑆𝑆 , + α ∙ Y ,
+ ε ,                                                                                                              (1) 
where subscripts i, t and n refer to firm, year and the forwarded year, respectively; S 
indicates sales; ASS is firm size measured in terms of total assets; Y represents dummy 
variables indicating that an observation belongs to a given year (with value 1, and zero 
otherwise); s and z are the subscripts for the estimators of sales growth and size, 
respectively, and ε is the error term. For simplicity, we use this last symbol to indicate the 
error term in all equations in this paper. 
Equation 2 analyzes the effects of slack on future sales growth, depending also on the 




= 𝛽 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝑆𝐿 , + 𝛽 ∙ log𝐴𝑆𝑆 , + 𝛽 ∙
𝑃𝑃𝐸 ,
𝑃𝑃𝐸 ,
+ α ∙ Y ,
+ ε ,                                                                                                    (2) 
Here, p is the subscript for the estimator of investment in property, plant and equipment 
(PPE), or, more precisely, for the increase in fixed assets of this kind. 
Previous research uses a range of different definitions and methodologies. While some 
use absolute measures of profitability and sales growth as dependent variables, others use 
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relative measures. These are combined with independent variables measuring slack 
indistinctly in either relative or absolute terms, in some cases indexed to industry values 
and in others to non-indexed values. In this paper we seek to avoid such methodological 
differences by defining variables in relative terms and standardizing them with industry-
year means and standard deviations, which avoids having to include variables of industry 
characteristics. However, we use non-standardized size values because these raw data 
allow us to make more appropriate comparisons between the firms of different industries 
and to perform logarithmic transformations. 
We forward the performance measures to better capture the effects of slack and to 
establish the direction of causality. In line with most previous studies (e.g. Tan, 2003; 
Tan and Wang, 2010; Peng et al., 2010; Bradley et al., 2011a; Salge and Vera, 2013), we 
forward performance by a year with respect to slack. That is, we first analyze the influence 
of slack at year t on performance at t+1. Considering additional forward periods may be 
controversial, because all slack data included between t and n-1 periods may be expected 
to gradually influence the corresponding forward performance. While the omission of the 
corresponding successive slacks would fail to capture their effects, their inclusion would 
entail problems of collinearity. However, in order to strengthen our outcomes by testing 
the influence over longer periods, we run further models using three years of forward 
performance. In this way, we calculate the average performances of the following three 
years and use them as dependent variables in this further analysis.  
A number of previous studies have analyzed the effect of slack in the same year (see 
Table 1), but their data are usually built from responses to questionnaires, where the 
identification of organizational slack corresponding to a given date is more problematic. 
Below, we provide descriptions, and outline calculations, of all the dependent and 




3.2.1 Dependent variables 
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In line with previous studies, we use two different indicators of firm profitability: return 
on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE)1. The former refers primarily to the financial 
profitability of firms, indicating how many dollars of earnings are derived from each 
dollar of assets controlled, while the latter considers the firms’ financial structure, 
measuring how efficient they are in generating profits from every unit of shareholder 
equity. We calculate the ROA by dividing operating income after depreciation (i.e. before 
financial income and expenses) at t+1 by total assets at t, and we calculate the ROE by 
dividing pre-tax income at t+1 by stockholder equity at t. 
Following Mishina et al. (2004), we use a relative measure of sales growth in Equation 
2. We calculate this by dividing sales at t+1 by sales at t, as indicated in the equation. We 
prefer this to an absolute measure of sales growth, as the latter mainly reflects size. Given 
that we use standardized variables with industry-year means and standard deviations, this 
variable provides an appropriate indicator of sales growth relative to industry behavior.  
We begin our analysis by forwarding performance one year with respect to slack, and 
continue with a future analysis for three-year forward performance measures, using the 
corresponding average ratios for t+1 to t+3 for any of these three performance measures 
as our dependent variables. 
 
 
3.2.2  Slack variables 
Following the well-established distinction between absorbed and unabsorbed slack (see, 
for example, Peng, 2003; Huang and Li, 2012), we use a wide array of both types, related 
to excess costs in organizations with low discretional use and to uncommitted resources 
allowing greater managerial discretion, respectively. 
As measures of absorbed slack, in line with previous studies (e.g. Hendricks et al., 
2009; Love and Nohria, 2005; Modi and Mishra, 2011), we use the ratios of inventories 
to sales (INVSL), property, plant and equipment to sales (PPESL) and selling, general and 
administrative expenses to sales (SGASL). As measures of unabsorbed slack, we use 
financial, equity-to-debt and cash slacks (FINSL, EQDSL and CASHSL, respectively). 
                                                          
1 These have been widely used elsewhere (Daniel et al., 2004). More recently, Tan and Peng (2003), Tan 
and Wang (2010), Modi and Mishra (2011), among others, employed ROA, while Ebben and Johnson 
(2005) used both dependent variables. 
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Following Mishina et al. (2004), Bradley et al. (2011b) and Zona (2012), we define 
financial slack as the difference between working capital available and working capital 
required, and we take its relative value with respect to total assets. More specifically, we 
calculate it as the ratio of current assets less current liabilities to total assets. 
In line with previous studies (e.g. Vanacker et al., 2013; George, 2005; Bradley et al., 
2001a, 2011b), we calculate equity-to-debt slack using the ratio of stockholder equity to 
current liabilities and long-term debt. 
Following Vanacker et al. (2013), Bradley et al. (2011a) and George (2005), we 
calculate cash slack using the ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets. 
We include the squared forms of all slack variables in the model to test their curvilinear 
relationships with the dependent variables. Moreover, we perform additional in-depth 
analyses when a curvilinear relationship is detected. In line with Lind and Mehlum 
(2010), we calculate the inflection points for any slack variable as well as their Fieller 
confidence intervals at 95%. We compare these with the lower and upper bounds of the 
range values of their variables and run the corresponding Lind and Mehlum U-tests. 
 
3.2.3  Control variables 
In the traditional cost behavior model, costs are described as fixed or variable with respect 
to an activity. Given that only variable costs can be immediately related to changes in 
sales, the increase/decrease in sales in a given period significantly influences firm 
profitability (Anderson et al., 2003). We expect an immediate positive influence of sales 
growth (St+1/St) on firm profitability. We also expect a positive influence of investments 
in PPE (PPEt+1/PPEt) on sales growth, because, given a certain level of slack, investment 
in production resources is a prerequisite to being able to afford sales expansion. In the 
same vein, cuts in firms’ productive equipment will entail restrictions in activity, and 
consequently in markets, products and any other subsequent reduction in sales. 
Size (logASS) is an important factor influencing firm performance. It is widely 
recognized that large firms enjoy advantages over small firms. Among these are 
economies of scale (see, Caves and Barton, 1990; Alvarez and Crespi, 2003), favorable 
access to credit markets and lower financing costs (see Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; 
Martinelli, 1997), more resources to better afford quality-related investments (see Noci, 
1994), etc. However, small firms have the advantage of being more flexible (You, 1995), 
they are less bureaucratic and more inclined to use resources efficiently (Baker and 
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Nelson, 2005), and they respond more quickly to changing circumstances (e.g. Knight 
and Cavusgil, 1996). Moreover, smaller firms usually attain higher growth rates than their 
bigger counterparts. While we expect a negative influence of size on growth, its influence 
on profitability is uncertain. Given the non-normal distribution of this variable, and as is 
common in business studies, we use the logarithm of total assets.  
We then use the ratio of one-year ahead sales to current sales (St+1/St) and size (logASS) 
as control variables in Equation 1, and the ratio of one-year ahead PPE to current PPE 
(PPEt+1/PPEt) and size (logASS) as control variables in Equation 2, in our first analysis 




We use COMPUSTAT data for all American industrial firms (SIC codes 2 and 3) 
presenting data between 1979 and 2009 and with at least twenty years of observations in 
the database. We prefer to use a stable sample of firms to ensure more reliable results, 
uncompromised that is by firms changing from one year to the next or by short-lived, 
unusual performers. Although such firms might potentially reveal interesting slack 
behavior, we consider a stable sample of firms to provide a more appropriate dynamic. 
We do not consider firms in the service industry because of their different cost structures 
and business approach. We start with 37,730 year-data observations from 1,453 firms 
available in the database. Table 2 displays sample and descriptive statistics: means, 
medians and year-data observations for the untransformed values for all dependent and 
independent variables used in our study. The average ROA for the 35,797 observations 
available for this ratio across the whole period is 9.3%, while the average ROE for a 
similar number of observations is 17.4%. Sales grew 15.8% on average, for the available 
sample in the period, matched by a similar growth rate for PPE. The corresponding values 
for the remaining variables are also shown in Table 2. 
----------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------ 
Given the panel data structure of our sample, assets are converted into values of the 
most recent year in our sample, applying the US inflation rate. We use the logarithm of 
these values as an independent variable in our study. 
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The substantial differences between mean and median values in the case of most 
variables, primarily in ROE, St+1/St, PPESL, EQDSL, CASHSL, PPEt+1/PPEt and ASS, 
suggest the existence of influential values, a fact which supports the convenience of 
winsorizing variables. We standardize all variables with means and standard deviations 
of year and industry values, with two SIC digits. All standardized variables are then 
winsorized to the top and bottom 1%. However, all results are substantially the same as 
with non-winsorized variables. 
Given that not all variables are available for all firms and years, the available sample 
for our multivariate analyses ranges from 1,422 to 1,423 firms, with 31,769 to 33,266 





5.1 Explorative analysis 
Table 3 shows the Pearson correlations for the winsorized variables in our sample. While 
all correlations are significant at p<0.01, their coefficients are not high. The highest value 
is 0.5385 (between the financial and equity slacks). For the sake of simplicity, we do not 
show the correlations for the squared slack variables, but the highest variation inflation 
factor in all the subsequent estimations performed, including these squared terms, is low: 




INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
5.2 Results for Equation 1 
We perform panel data regressions with our sample, correcting for autocorrelation 
disturbances. The Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of no correlation between 
individual effects and explanatory variables. As individual effects are correlated with the 
regressors in all estimations, the random effects estimator is inconsistent, while the fixed 
16 
 
effects estimator is consistent and efficient. We, therefore, perform panel data estimations 
with fixed effects. 
Assuming that the results obtained from Equation 1 may be biased, as some of the 
covariates may be endogenous, we check for this possibility. The equation includes sales 
growth as a control variable influencing firm profitability, though this growth, in turn, 
depends on increased investment in productive capacity. We, therefore, include 
investment in PPE (PPEt+1/PPEt) as an instrument for sales growth (St+1/St) in Equation 
1. The residuals for sales growth depending on this instrument, with fixed effects 
estimation, are significant at p<0.01 when included in Equation 1. This, as suspected, 
points to the existence of endogenous disturbances both with and without squared terms. 
We then use the two-stages least squares estimator, available in STATA, for the fixed 
effects option. 
Columns A and B in Table 4 display results for both measures of one-year ahead 
profitability. All models estimated in this table present a significant goodness of fit, with 
overall R-squares of 19.7% (when the dependent variable is ROA) and 3.6% (when the 
dependent variable is ROE). Coefficients for the year dummies are not displayed, for the 
sake of simplicity. In all estimations, sales growth and size present significant positive 
and negative influences, respectively, on firm profitability.  
 
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
As for our variables of interest, the results in column A reveal that the relationships 
between slack and ROA are linear only for financial and cash slacks (see the non-
significant coefficients of their squared terms at p<0.1), while they are non-linear for the 
remaining slack variables. The significant (at p<0.01) negative signs for slack in 
inventories and PPE, matched with significant (at p<0.01) positive signs for their 
corresponding squared terms, reveal non-linear relationships between these slack 
variables and one-year ahead ROA, suggesting U-shaped relationships. On the other hand, 
the significant coefficients for slacks in selling, general and administrative expenses 
(SGA) and equity, matched with significant negative signs for their squared terms, 
suggest inverted U-shaped relationships between these slacks and one-year ahead ROA. 
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Column B in this table displays estimations when the dependent variable is ROE, 
revealing non-linear relationships only for slacks in inventories and PPE, with positive 
significant signs at p<0.01 and p<0.1, respectively, for their squared terms, thus 
suggesting U-shaped relationships. 
 
 
5.3 Results for Equation 2 
We also assume that the results obtained from Equation 2 may be biased because 
endogeneity is likely to affect the estimations. The independent variable for investment 
in PPE (PPEt+1/PPEt) in this equation depends on past sales growth, as well as on past 
profitability. We, therefore, include past sales growth (St/St-1) and profitability (ROAt) as 
instruments for PPEt+1/PPEt in this equation. The residuals for the latter variable 
depending on these instruments, with fixed effects estimation, is significant at p<0.01 
when included in Equation 2, thus revealing again the existence of endogenous 
disturbances. We again use the two-stages least squares estimator with fixed effects. 
Column C in Table 4 displays the corresponding results. Again, the Hausman test rejects 
the null hypothesis of no correlation between individual effects and explanatory variables 
and we, therefore, perform panel data estimations with fixed effects. Coefficients for the 
dummy variables for years are again, for the sake of simplicity, not displayed. The model 
estimated in this column presents a significant goodness of fit, with an overall R-square 
of 17.4%. Size and the investment in PPE present significant (at p<0.01) negative and 
positive signs, respectively, as expected. With respect to our variables of interest, with 
the exception of inventory slack, there are non-linear relationships between all slack 
variables and the dependent variable. The significant signs for PPE, financial and cash 
slacks, matched with significant negative signs for their squared terms, provide 
preliminary support for the existence of inverted U-shaped relationships between these 
variables and one-year ahead sales growth, while the significant positive signs for the 
squared terms of SGA and equity slacks provide preliminary support for the existence of 







5.4 Analysis of curvilinear relationships 
The relationships between most types of slack and the dependent variables are curvilinear, 
especially with future ROA and sales growth. Table 5 presents a summary of our in-depth 
analysis of these curvilinear relationships for the estimations in Table 4. In terms of the 
main purpose of this study, despite the U-shaped (and inverted U-shaped) relationships 
suggested by the significant signs of the squared slack variables (see columns B and C), 
all minimum and maximum points lie outside the range of the statistical distribution of 
the slack variables (see columns D and E in Table 5). Recall we use standardized and 
winsorized variables in our study. With the exception of equity slack (when the dependent 
variable is ROA), all the maximum/minimum points of the slack variables lie outside their 
data ranges or the Fieller intervals (at 95%) of these maximum/minimum points range 
outside the upper/lower bounds of their slack variable ranges (see column G in Table 5). 
The Lind and Mehlum tests for the slope of the lower/upper bounds of these variables 
(when the inflection points are inside but the 95% Fieller intervals are outside the ranges) 
are non-significant, and so they fail to provide support for the existence of U-shaped or 








As can be seen in columns E to G for panels A and B, the minimum profitability points 
match up to very high values for inventories and PPE slacks: 6.49707 and 3.54604, 
respectively, in the case of the dependent variable ROA, and 3.93817 and 7.72551, 
respectively, in that of the dependent variable ROE. Accordingly, the positive 
relationships between these variables and future profitability would only start at 
remarkably high values (outside the data range if we consider the Fieller interval of the 
minimum points), while for the lower (whole 100%) distribution of these variables, their 
influences on profitability are negative. Conversely, the maximum ROA is reached at a 
remarkably low value for SGA slack: -5.48911. Therefore, for the upper (whole 100%) 
distribution of this slack variable, its influence on ROA is negative, while it would be 
positive only for the lower values (outside the range).  
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Similarly (see panel C in Table 5), the maximums depicted by the curvilinear influence 
of PPE and cash slacks on future sales growth are attained at notably high values (outside 
the range) for these slack variables (4.625628 and 3.84736, respectively). While for the 
lower (whole 100%) distribution of values, the relationships between these variables and 
sales growth are positive, and they are negative only for the upper values (outside the 
range). The positive influence of SGA slack on future sales growth in the corresponding 
U-shaped relationship starts with a notably low value for this slack variable: -3.51874. 
Only below the lower values outside the range of its distribution would the influence on 
the dependent variable be negative, while it is positive for the upper (whole 100%) values 
of its distribution range. In contrast, equity slack negatively influences future sales growth 
for most of its range of values (the lower 98.36%), and only after a very high equity-to-
debt ratio (3.30036) does it start to have a positive influence on the dependent variable, 
i.e. for the upper 1.64% (100 − 98.36) of its distribution, which is outside the range 
considering the 95% Fieller interval for the corresponding minimum point (see panel C 
in Table 5). Similarly, sales growth attains its maximum when the value for financial 
slack is -2.1912538. Accordingly, the positive relationship between both variables is 
found in the lower 1.56% of this variable distribution, outside the data range if we 
consider the Fieller interval for this maximum point. For the upper 98.44% (the whole 
100% if we consider the Fieller interval) of its distribution, the relationship between this 
variable and sales growth is negative. 
Therefore, the influence of slack on firm performance is either solely positive or 
negative, with the exception of equity slack when the dependent variable is the one-year 
ahead ROA. In this case, the corresponding Lind and Mehlum U-test is significant at 
p<0.01 (t-value of 5.33), providing support for an inverted U-shaped relationship. The 
maximum profitability is 0.87809 for equity slack. The upper 10.05% (100 – 89.95) of its 
distribution range has a negative influence on the dependent variable, while in the lower 
89.95% the influence is positive (see panel C in table 5). Although the relationship 
between these variables is positive for most of the range of the slack variable distribution, 
the overall influence of equity slack on the one-year ahead ROA is negative, because the 
upper range values for this slack variable are very high and profitability decreases sharply 
in this upper range. While the estimates reveal an overall negative influence on the 
dependent variable (see the significant negative sign for this variable), the influence of 
this slack is positive for most values in the distribution. Panels A, B and C in Figure 1 









5.5 Stepwise regressions 
We next perform four stepwise regressions for each of our dependent variables, in order 
to assess how much each additional set of variables adds to the explanation of the 
dependent variables. In a first step we just include control variables, the second and third 
steps add absorbed and unabsorbed slack variables, respectively, to the basic model with 
control variables, while in the fourth step we run regressions between our dependent 
variables and all independent variables included in our Equations 1 and 2 (i.e.: control 
and absorbed and unabsorbed slack variables). 
Table 6 shows a summary of these results. All regressions present significant goodness-
of-fit at p<0.001. Wald tests indicate that each set of variables add substantial explanatory 
power of the dependent variables in the full model. Despite the incremental R2 may seem 
small in some cases, their corresponding incremental values are significant at p<.01 in all 
cases. Moreover, the signs and significances of our control and variables of interest (not 
displayed because of simplicity) are essentially the same, in most cases, as those displayed 
in Table 4 across all of these stepwise regressions. Results (again not displayed because 
of simplicity) are also essentially the same, as those presented in Table 5, with respect to 
the analysis of the curvilinear relationships between our slack and dependent variables. 
 
----------------------------------------------- 





5.6 Supplementary analyses 
We perform additional analyses considering longer lagged periods of the influence of 
slack on performance. Table 7 displays the results for the estimations of Equations 1 and 
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2, where the dependent variables are the corresponding three-year ahead performance 
averages. As with estimations using one-year ahead performances, given problems of 
endogeneity, we again perform two-stages least squares estimations. In Equation 1, the 
average investment in PPE (for the three years following the reference period for the slack 
variables) is the instrument for the average sales growth in these years. In Equation 2, the 
endogenous variable (average investment in PPE for the three following years) depends 
on two instrument variables: average sales growth and profitability of the previous three 
years. Table 7 shows estimations for these equations, and Table 8 a summary of the 
corresponding relationships between slack and performance. Although there are some 
differences in the linearity and curvilinearity of the relationships with respect to the main 
underlying relationships, the results are similar to those for one-year ahead performance. 
Only two (out of 18) present U-shaped relationships (i.e. between equity slack and both 
ROE and sales growth), but the bulk of both ranges (the lower 97.2% and 95.2%, 
respectively) presents a negative influence of slack on performance (as in Table 5). In the 
case of inverted U-shaped relationships between financial slack and ROE, and between 
PPE slack and sales growth, the 95% Fieller intervals of the maximum points lie outside 
the variable range values, and the U-tests are only significant at p<0.1. 
------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLES 7 AND 8 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Additional analyses (not displayed, for sake of simplicity) including variables with 
industry characteristics (that is, number and size of competitors) do not change our results. 
As expected, given that our variables are standardized with industry-year means and 




5.7 Summary of results 
In short, in 10 out of the 11 cases in which the signs of the squared variables are 
significant, our analyses fail to confirm the preliminary assessment of the existence of U-
shaped or inverted U-shaped relationships, and in all cases the relationships are 
monotonic over the relevant data range values. Despite the relationships suggested by the 
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data in Table 4, the curvilinear relationships between slack and performance cannot be 
interpreted as U-shaped or inverted U-shaped, as has been concluded in studies conducted 
elsewhere. On the contrary, the overall influence of slack on performance is either 
positive or negative (linear, concave or convex) depending on the type of slack and the 
measure of performance being analyzed. According to our results, absorbed slack 
influences future profitability negatively and future sales growth positively. The influence 
of unabsorbed slack would appear to be more complex. While financial and equity slacks 
have a positive influence on future ROA (the corresponding influence of cash slack being 
negative), their influence on future sales growth is negative (the corresponding influence 
of cash slack here being positive). 
Results are essentially the same when we consider three years lagged periods of the 




George (2005, p. 672) reframed the simple question of whether slack is good for 
performance into a more complex set of questions: “How much of what form of slack is 
good for performance?” and “When is slack good for performance?”. Interpretations of 
U-shaped and hump-shaped relationships suggest there is no absolute advantage or 
liability in the existence of slack, and that resources should either be optimized in order 
to maximize performance or kept outside of a certain range to avoid minimum 
performance. From this perspective, the key is to determine either the intermediate 
optimal or the less performant level of slack. Empirical academic research claimed to 
provide support for these theoretical tenets when significant signs for several slack 
indicators, as well as for their corresponding squared variables, were found in the 
estimations of regression models (e.g. Tan and Peng, 2003; Tan and Wang, 2010; Chiu 
and Liaw, 2009). However, some estimations provide maximum and minimum points that 
lie outside a plausible range of values, and their corresponding hump- or U-shaped 
relationships may be more formal than effective possibilities. For example, the 
estimations in Chiu and Liaw (2009) provide maximum and minimum profitability at 
values of 16.6 and 5.25 for available and recoverable slacks, respectively. These authors 
define available slack as the ratio of current assets to current liabilities, and recoverable 
slack as the ratio of SGA to sales. We would be unlikely to find a firm with current assets 
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16.6 times greater than current liabilities (a mere 0.65% in our sample of about 37,000 
observations not previously winsorized). Similarly, we would be highly unlikely to find 
a surviving firm with an SGA 5.25 times greater than sales (not a single observation in 
our sample). Consequently, despite the authors’ claims of having found U-shaped and 
inverted U-shaped relationships between available and recoverable slacks and 
profitability, respectively, they are actually positive and negative effects, comparable to 
the effects we find between our corresponding variables (FINSL and SGASL) and ROA. 
In our study, we find curvilinear relationships between slack and performance, also 
apparently resembling U- and inverted U-shapes, but, in fact, they are merely positive or 
negative. Therefore, our results have crucial implications for theories arguing the 
existence of thresholds of slack. They provide support for the existence of absolute 
advantages and disadvantages of slack, which means that the influence of a given slack 
on performance is solely positive or negative. There are no intermediate optimal or less 
performant levels of slack. Resources can fuel or decrease performance, depending on the 
type of slack and the type of performance, with simple positive or negative influences in 
most cases. 
Previous studies of the influence of slack on performance have analyzed different types 
of slack, but they examine their influence on just one (or various similar) measures of 
performance, usually profitability. Our research supports the findings of previous studies 
regarding the diverse impacts of different types of slack on firm performance but here we 
contribute evidence of opposite and conflicting influences on profitability and growth. 
For all six measures of slack used in this study we find these opposite effects. This finding 
has interesting implications since it points to the existence of conflicting strategic 
objectives or, more precisely, it suggests that resources cannot be used to attain 
profitability and growth simultaneously. On the contrary, managers must balance these 
conflicting effects, endowing more or less of a particular resource depending on its 
specific impact and on the relative priority given to one or other of these strategic 
objectives. According to our results, while the endowment of a specific resource has a net 
marginal benefit for one objective, it entails a net marginal loss for the other. As such, 
our findings have interesting implications for our understanding of organizational and 
agency theory postulates on the influence of slack on performance. 
We find that absorbed slack has a positive influence on future growth but a negative 
influence on profitability. As such, the positive effects of slack on performance, as 
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hypothesized by organizational theory, apply in relation to absorbed slack acting on future 
growth. Our results suggest that excess inventories and PPE provide firms with flexibility 
to exploit market opportunities (including the availability to deliver unexpected 
customers’ orders), to protect themselves against mismatches between supply and 
demand, or to attend to growing demand. All in all, this flexibility enhances sales growth. 
Similarly, the positive relationship between SGA slack and sales growth suggests that the 
staffing resources included in these expenses provide a buffer to environmental threats 
and allow firms to explore and exploit future opportunities for business growth. These 
results also seem to suggest that SGA slack allows for the necessary managerial attention 
to the coordination and planning needed to ensure long-term business expansion. When 
there is no excess capacity, managers can only attend to daily operational routines and 
address urgent tasks as they arise; this being the case, they are unable to devote any efforts 
to strategic value-added activities aimed at long-term firm survival and expansion.  
The positive concave relationships for inventories and PPE indicate decreasing 
marginal effects of this slack on growth, while the positive convex relationship for SGA 
indicates increasing marginal effects of this slack. According to these relationships, the 
effect of tangible absorbed slack, such as inventories or equipment, on future growth is 
limited compared to the corresponding exponential effect of intangible absorbed slack, 
such as the managerial coordination and resource planning included in SGA. Raw 
materials, machines and equipment must be preferentially used for a defined 
manufacturing purpose. All of them, as well as finished products, may have an important 
role in fueling growth, but their influence decreases when current markets are sufficiently 
supplied. Managerial efforts may produce increasing marginal effects because they can 
be assigned to the development of new markets or products.  
The negative influence of all our absorbed slack variables on profitability provides 
support for the agency theory stance. These results suggest that firms apply abundant 
absorbed resources, regardless of profitability. Managers may decide to maintain buffers 
in inventories, machine, equipment or SGA aimed merely at growth and/or at self-serving 
interests such as prestige or different kinds of rewards. Where they have a wealth of these 
resources, managers do not pay full attention to stretching them appropriately, and any 
additional committed resource progressively decreases profitability. Moreover, managers 
tend to convert excess available slack into unnecessary or self-interested activities, 
especially when managerial tasks are difficult to monitor and control. Given that size is 
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an additional factor influencing this difficulty, it is not implausible that one important 
factor behind an abundance of absorbed slack is managers’ opacity limiting principal’s 
scrutiny, thus reinforcing the growth-profitability loop. The decrease in profitability is 
greater with increasing SGA slack, than with inventories and PPE slacks, as can be seen 
by the former’s higher negative coefficient, as well as by its concave negative 
relationship, compared to the lower coefficients and convex negative curves of the latter. 
These results suggest that managers prefer to utilize resources embedded in SGA to 
pursue self-interest objectives. 
Unabsorbed slack has more diverse and complex influences on performance than 
absorbed slack, because it has more potential uses. However, some common patterns can 
be identified from our results for unabsorbed slack. Like absorbed slack, there are solely 
positive or negative relationships between most ranges of these variables and 
performance, with opposite and conflicting influences on profitability and sales growth. 
While the influence of cash slack on performance is similar to that of absorbed slack, 
financial and equity slacks influence profitability and growth positively and negatively, 
respectively. These results suggest that financial and equity wealth is associated with 
management complacency, inhibiting experimentation and risk taking, and having a 
negative influence on long-term growth. By contrast, firms with lower financial and 
equity wealth must rely more on indebtedness, withstanding greater financial stress and 
expenses, which decreases profitability but forces managers to take proactive action to 
look for new opportunities and overcome the financial stress. Accordingly, agency theory 
assumptions seem to play an important role in the relationship between unabsorbed slack 
and growth. In this scenario, indebtedness is a disciplinary factor. Financial and equity 
constraints alter the way in which resources are expended, avoiding manager empire 
building and ensuring resources are devoted to strictly necessary business operations, 
while a lack of these constraints contributes to agency behavior. It should also be noted 
that the level of a firm’s slack is also the outcome of management decisions. Firms 
undertaking proactive investment decisions are more likely to need external financial 
resources, thus increasing their financial stress. By assuming higher financial costs, they 
lower profitability. The opposite effect is found in conservative firms with few investment 
projects. Financial slack reflects the automatic operating liquidity provided by working 
capital. As it increases, short-term financial stress falls and, consequently, it acts as a 
greater financial buffer. Similarly, greater equity slack means lower indebtedness, which 
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entails lower financial expenses and higher profits. Our results for the relationships 
between financial and equity slack and profitability provide support for the positive effect 
of slack on performance, as hypothesized by organizational theory. The greater positive 
effect of financial slack on profitability indicates that organizational theory plays a more 
important role in relation to this slack. The positive linear relationship between financial 
slack and profitability, compared to the corresponding positive concave relationship for 
equity slack, reinforces this more important role. The relationship between equity slack 
and profitability is positive for most of the distribution range of this independent variable, 
yet it is matched with a negative agency effect. At a crucial point, profitability decreases 
sharply, suggesting that complacency and opportunistic behaviors play a dominant role 
across the upper 10.05% of the distribution range of this variable. It is the only slack 
variable in our study that presents an effective inflection point, or to be more precise that 
depicts an inverted U-shaped relationship, where profitability decreases sharply across 
the small upper distribution range. 
The higher negative coefficients of absorbed slack compared to those of unabsorbed 
slack, when the dependent variable is profitability, suggest that these latter resources 
provide more opportunities for redeploying resources to more profitable opportunities, or 
for devoting these high-discretion resources to exploring new and more favorable 
opportunities, while absorbed slack is more constrained to current uses and better suited 
to expanding current business at the expense of profitability. 
Finally, our results have general implications for theory. Both, organizational and 
agency theories are imprecise with respect to the influence of slack on firm performance 
in some points. First, there are no precise and elaborated formulations with respect to the 
existence of non-linear relationships in these theories. There are several hints, suggestions 
or explanations provided by some authors (see section 2) which mainly repeat, overlap 
and combine the fundamentals of both theories, but they are no precise enough with 
respect to the extent, feasibility, circumstances and factors which would determine the 
turning points of the prevailing positive into negative influences, and/or vice-versa. It 
perhaps requires a new theory, or a synthesis of both theories acknowledging or 
reconciling the effect and importance of both influences of slack on performance, as well 
as their interplay. Second, both theories are ambiguous and ill-defined with respect to the 
array of available resources and business companies’, or organizations’, objectives, and 
its associated measures of performance. Profitability is an important firms’ objective, but 
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they may also share it with growth, quality, market share, customer or client satisfaction, 
environmental and social issues, etc., or even prefer them to it. Moreover, there are also 
very different types of available resources, even within both the absorbed and unabsorbed 
slack categories, which may diversely influence performance. New accurate and detailed 
theory is required with respect to the precise influence of specific types of slack on 




In this study we have analyzed the influence of slack on future firm performance using 
standardized and winsorized dependent and independent variables. Assuming that the 
effects of slack on performance are likely to vary according to the slack and performance 
indicators used, we employed three indicators of absorbed and unabsorbed slack, in 
addition to two ratios of profitability (ROA and ROE) and a ratio of sales growth as 
dependent variables. We use a panel data sample of firms with at least twenty years of 
observations in COMPUSTAT. 
Although the relationships between most slack and performance measures are found 
to be curvilinear, the inflection points (both maximums and minimums) lie outside the 
range of our slack variables or they are biased values of their distribution ranges. In 10 
out of 11 cases of significant signs presented by the squared slack variables (13 out of 15 
in the case of the three-year forward performance), our analyses do not provide support 
for the existence of either U-shaped or inverted U-shaped relationships. In the few 
remaining cases, the maximum or minimum points are implausible real values. 
Consequently, the effects of slack on performance are either positive or negative for the 
relevant values of the distribution ranges of these slack variables, and only in a tiny part 
of their lower or upper ranges do the signs of influence change. In fact, the relationships 
between slack and future performance are either positive or negative, and either linear, 
concave or convex.  
According to our findings, there are no plausible crucial slack levels that permit a 
maximum or minimum future performance. Resource endowment with respect to slack is 
not, therefore, a technical question that offers a solution to an optimization problem.  
28 
 
The opposite and conflicting effects of slack on profitability and growth are important 
additional implications to be derived from our study. Overall, we find that absorbed slack 
has opposite and conflicting effects on future profitability and sales growth, that is, 
negative and positive, respectively. Results are robust to the consideration of different 
periods of future performance. The influence of unabsorbed slack is more complex and 
less univocal than that of absorbed slack. A manager deploys resources depending on 
their availability and in line with the firm’s strategy, considering that the greater the 
absorbed slack the higher its future sales growth will be, but the worse its future 
profitability. As such, the manager in deploying resources seeks to balance their opposite 
impacts on profitability and growth, prioritizing a specific strategic objective. Future 
research may find actual evidence of such relationships, perhaps in specific contexts or 
with certain moderating effects, but in the meantime academics should use the appropriate 
methodology to test them. 
The measurement of the influence of slack on performance over long-term periods is 
subject to limitations. There is no substantial theoretical support for an appropriate limit 
for this forward period on which this influence should be projected. On the other hand, 
provided that an n forward period is appropriate, it is implausible that subsequent 
consecutive forward slacks would not also influence the subsequent forward 
performance. Even the slack in the same n forward period influences current performance. 
Moreover, the inclusion of consecutive slacks entails problems of collinearity. 
An interesting additional avenue for future research is to assess the future term at 
which the influence of different types of slack is recorded. This would also include the 
examination of methodological issues for dealing with the simultaneous slack effects of 
consecutive periods and any subsequent changes. Likewise, more research is needed with 
respect to the different opportunities that can arise from this issue. Specifically, more 
analyses are needed that consider longer term effects, and more complex interactions and 
moderators, of slack on different indicators of firm performance. Additionally, in line 
with previous studies (e.g. Lecuona and Rietzig, 2104; Bradley et al., 2011; Mishina et 
al., 2004; Love and Nohria, 2005), a greater variety of environments and settings should 
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Table 1 Details of studies reviewed. 
Author Dependent variables 
Dependent variable 
definition Independent slack variables Slack variables definition 
Performance 
forward with respect 
to slack Significant relationship 
Tan and Peng 
(2003): study 1 
After-tax return on 
assets and market 
position 
Firm measure built 
with responses to a 
questionnaire 
Excess capacity, retained earnings, 
discretionary fund, debt financing 
Firm measure built with 
responses to a 
questionnaire 
Same year Positive and negative 
according to different 
slack measures 
Tan and Peng 
(2003): study 2 
Pre-tax profit Firm amount Major repair fund, inventory fund, 
accounts payable, depreciation fund, 
reserve fund, loan, sales expenses, 
and retained earnings 
Firm standardized Z-
scores 
Same year Curvilinear 
Tan (2003) ROA Firm ratio Depreciation funds on total assets, 
retained earnings on total assets 
Firm ratios One year forward Curvilinear 
Mishina et al. 
(2004) 
Sales growth Two years’ growth 
relative to previous 
year 
HR and working capital available 
minus required 
HR slack: firm ratio less 
industry average ratio 
Financial slack: firm 
amount 
Two years forward Positive and non-
significant for HR and 
financial slack, 
respectively 




Firm ratios SGA-to-sales Firm ratio Slack lagged with 
various years 
Negative 
George (2005) Gross profit Firm amount Amount of cash reserves, debt-to-
equity ratio, amount of equity plus 
debt less fixed and non-current 
assets, and amount of resource 
demand 
Firm deviations from the 
industry mean. Ratios and 
amounts depending on the 
slack measure 
Same year Curvilinear 
Voss et al. (2008) Product exploration 
and exploitation 
Firm measures built 
with the mean score of 
responses to three 
items related to any of 
these two product 
characteristics on a 
questionnaire 
Cash reserves and subscription 
revenues divided by total expenses, 
empty seats divided by total seating 
capacity, and number of full-time 
directors, designers and HR slack 
actors on a theatre’s staff divided by 
total number of directors, designers 
and actors 
Firm ratios Same year Negative, positive and 
non-significant, 
depending on the slack 
and dependent variable 
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Tan and Wang 
(2010) 
ROA Firm ratio Market expenses, R&D, Inventory, 
retained earnings 
Firm amount One year forward Positive and negative 




Patents Firm amount HR slack Firm ratio less industry 
average ratio 
Four years forward Positive 
Peng et al. (2010) ROA Firm ratio Current assets less current liabilities-
to-total assets and debt-to-total 
assets 
Firm ratios One year forward Positive 




Firm amount Working capital available less 
working capital required, equity-to-
debt ratio and SGA-to-sales ratio 
Firm amount for working 
capital and firm ratios for 
equity-to-debt and SGA-
to-sales 
Four years forward Positive in working 
capital and non-
significant for the 
remaining slack 
variables 
Modi i Mishra 
(2011) 
ROA, stock return 
and Tobin’s Q 
Firm ratios Sales to inventory, sales to PPE and 
sales to SGA 
Firm standardized ratios 
with respect to industry 
ratios 
Same year Curvilinear 
Bradley et al. 
(2011a) 
Operating profit Firm amount Cash reserves, accounts receivable 
plus inventory and logarithm of 
equity-to-debt 
Firm amount for cash 
reserves and accounts plus 
inventory, and firm ratio 
for equity-to-debt 
One year forward Curvilinear 
Su et al. (2011) Performance Firm measure built 
with responses to five 
items related to 
growth, profitability, 
quality, service and 
overall performance 
on a questionnaire 
Flexibility of employed resources 
and unabsorbed slack 
Firm measure built with 
responses to five items 
related to employed 
resources and three items 
related to unabsorbed 
slack, on a questionnaire 
Same year Positive 
36 
 
Elbanna (2012) Organizational 
performance 
Firm measure built 
with the mean score of 
responses to ten items 
related to financial, 
customer, internal 
business and learning 
perspectives on a 
questionnaire 
Organizational slack Firm measure built with 
responses to five items on 
a questionnaire 
Same year Positive 
Huang and Li 
(2012) 
Project performance Firm measure built 
with responses to six 
items on a 
questionnaire 
Absorbed slack and interacted with 
exploitative and exploratory learning 
Firm measure built with 
responses to three items 
related to absorbed and 
unabsorbed slack on a 
questionnaire 





Yang and Liu 
(2012) 
Performance Firm measure built 
with responses to three 
items on a 
questionnaire 
Customer, supplier and competitor 
agility 
Firm measure built with 
responses to three items 
on each indicator from a 
questionnaire 
Same year Positive 





Responses to three 




Operational slack The share of unoccupied 
hospital beds 




Lecuona i Reitzig 
(2014) 
Logarithm of gross 
profits 
Firm amount HR slack for workers, technicians, 
plant managers  
Firm ratios less industry 
ratios 
Same period Positive and negative 
depending on the HR 
slack 
Vanacker et al. 
(2013) 
Sales less cost goods 
sold scaled by total 
assets 
Firm ratio Cash to assets, debt-to-equity, 
accounts receivables and inventory 
on total assets, and HR slack 
The slack measures are 
indexed to industry norms 
by subtracting the mean 
industry ratio, but HR 
slack is not indexed 
Three years forward Positive, negative and 
curvilinear depending 
on the slack 




Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
  
Year-data 
observations Mean Median 
ROA 35,797 0.0930432 0.0977066 
ROE 35,793 0.1740177 0.1141987 
St+1/St 35,777 1.15869 1.070002 
INVSL 37,369 0.2237011 0.1521448 
PPESL 37,367 0.596642 0.2156376 
SGASL 35,298 0.2434785 0.2191778 
FINSL 36,848 0.2752007 0.2839361 
EQDSL 36,918 2.074153 1.15805 
CASHSL 36,762 0.123923 0.0656709 
PPEt+1/PPEt 35,698 1.161881 1.037553 
ASS* 37,454 4300.72 296.0074 
Notes: 
* Constant values: 000 $. ROA is return on assets; ROE return on equity; S sales; INVSL 
inventory slack; PPESL property, plant and equipment slack; SGASL selling, general 
and administrative expenses slack; FINSL financial slack; EQDSL equity-to-debt slack; 





Table 3 Pearson correlations 
 
 INVSL PPESL SGASL FINSL EQDSL CASHSL St+1/St lnASS PPEt+1/PPEt 
FINSL          
INVSL 1         
PPESL 0.0267*** 1        
SGASL 0.1327*** -0.1343*** 1       
FINSL 0.2243*** -0.2848*** 0.1436*** 1      
EQDSL 0.036*** -0.0247*** 0.1059*** 0.5385*** 1     
CASHSL -0.0344*** 0.1107*** 0.1889*** 0.3517*** 0.4362*** 1    
St+1/St 0.0677*** 0.0814*** 0.0593*** 0.0253*** 0.0273*** 0.1073*** 1   
lnASS -0.1424*** 0.1776*** -0.2345*** -0.2445*** -0.1876*** -0.0591*** -0.0592*** 1  
PPEt+1/PPEt -0.039*** -0.0735*** -0.0122** 0.1247*** 0.0922*** 0.096*** 0.4098*** -0.0456*** 1 
 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels based on two-tailed tests, respectively. S is sales; INVSL 
inventory slack; PPESL property, plant and equipment slack; SGASL selling, general and administrative expenses slack; FINSL financial 
slack; EQDSL equity-to-debt slack; CASHSL cash slack; PPE property, plant and equipment, and ASS total assets. 
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Table 4 Fixed effects estimations for the influence of slack on future performance, correcting 
for endogeneity (two-stages least squares estimator). Standard errors in parentheses. 
 










Absorbed slack    
INVSL: Inventory slack -0.258*** -0.110*** 0.195*** 
 (0.00811) (0.00789) (0.0103) 
INVSL2 0.0199*** 0.0140*** -0.00257 
 (0.00341) (0.00332) (0.00437) 
PPESL: PPE slack -0.260*** -0.102*** 0.325*** 
 (0.0102) (0.00990) (0.0153) 
PPESL2 0.0366*** 0.00663* -0.0351*** 
 (0.00379) (0.00369) (0.00525) 
SGASL: SGA slack -0.346*** -0.120*** 0.0838*** 
 (0.00953) (0.00927) (0.0129) 
SGASL2 -0.0315*** -0.00423 0.0119** 
 (0.00425) (0.00413) (0.00552) 
Unabsorbed slack    
FINSL: financial slack 0.0992*** 0.0385*** -0.104*** 
 (0.00733) (0.00713) (0.00991) 
FINSL2 0.00515 -0.00355 -0.0238*** 
 (0.00371) (0.00361) (0.00478) 
EQDSL: equity slack 0.0390*** -0.0239** -0.103*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0100) (0.0140) 
EQDSL2 -0.0222*** 0.00342 0.0155*** 
 (0.00325) (0.00316) (0.00435) 
CASHSL: cash slack -0.0793*** -0.0115 0.0749*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0109) (0.0145) 
CASHSL2 -0.00326 -0.00341 -0.00973** 
 (0.00343) (0.00334) (0.00437) 
Control variables    
St+1/St: sales growth 0.485*** 0.213***  
 (0.0107) (0.0104)  
logASS: size -0.0621*** -0.105*** -0.209*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0136) (0.0186) 
PPEt+1/PPEt: investment in 
PPE 
  0.753*** 
   (0.0286) 
Dummies for years Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.152*** 0.234*** 0.531*** 
 (0.0390) (0.0380) (0.0503) 
    
R2 0.1967*** 0.0361*** 0.1738*** 
Number of gvkey 1,422 1,422 1,420 




Notes: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels based on 
two-tailed tests, respectively. ROA is return on assets; ROE return on equity; S sales; INVSL 
inventory slack; PPESL property, plant and equipment slack; SGASL selling, general and 
administrative expenses slack; FINSL financial slack; EQDSL equity-to-debt slack; CASHSL 




Table 5 Summary of slack relationships between slack and one-year ahead performance (with data from Table 4) 











Preliminary type of 
relationship 





p-value (lower % 





most range values 
Panel A: return on assets (ROAt+1)      
INVSL − + U-shaped Minimum 6.497076935 > 99.99 % Outside range Negative convex 
PPESL − + U-shaped Minimum 3.546041069 > 98.85 % Outside range2 Negative convex 
SGASL − − Inverted U-shaped Maximum -5.489114862 < 0.01 % Outside range Negative concave 
FINSL +  Linear --- --- --- --- Positive linear 
EQDSL − − Inverted U-shaped Maximum 0.87808144 > 89.95 % Inside range3 Positive concave 
CASHSL −  Linear --- --- --- --- Negative linear 
Panel B: return on equity (ROE t+1)      
INVSL − + U-shaped Minimum 3.938179484 > 99.99 % Outside range Negative convex 
PPESL − +* U-shaped Minimum 7.72551875 > 99.99 % Outside range Negative convex 
SGASL −  Linear --- --- --- --- Negative linear 
FINSL +  Linear --- --- --- --- Positive linear 
EQDSL −**  Linear --- --- --- --- Negative linear 
CASHSL   Non-significant --- --- --- --- No influence 
Panel C: sales growth (St+1/St)     
INVSL +  Linear --- --- --- --- Positive linear 
PPESL + − Inverted U-shaped Maximum 4.625628663 > 99.99 % Outside range Positive concave 
SGASL + +** U-shaped Minimum -3.518742077 < 0.01 % Outside range Positive convex 
FINSL − − Inverted U-shaped Maximum -2.191253796 < 1.56 % Outside range2 Negative concave 
EQDSL − + U-shaped Minimum 3.300366265 > 98.36 % Outside range2 Negative convex 
CASHSL + −** Inverted U-shaped Maximum 3.847364527 > 99.99 % Outside range Positive concave 
 
Notes: 1: All signs are significant at p<0.01, with the exception of those with * (significant at p<0.1) and ** (significant at p<0.05). ROA is return on 
assets; ROE return on equity; S sales; INVSL inventory slack; PPESL property, plant and equipment slack; SGASL selling, general and administrative 
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expenses slack; FINSL financial slack; EQDSL equity-to-debt slack, and CASHSL cash slack. 2: The inflection point is inside the range variable, but the 
95% Fieller interval of the extreme point is outside the range. The U-test for the slope in the upper or lower bound is non-significant in at p<0.1. 3: The 




Table 6 Stepwise regressions for each dependent variable 











absorbed slack & 
unabsorbed slack 
variables 
Panel A: Dependent variable ROA     
R2 overall 0.136*** 0.1808*** 0.1585*** 0.1967*** 
∆R2 overall: the corresponding step vs step I  0.0448*** 0.0225*** 0.0607*** 
∆R2 overall: full model vs absorbed slack    0.0159*** 
∆R2 overall: full model vs unabsorbed slack    0.0382** 
Panel B: Dependent variable ROE     
R2 overall 0.021*** 0.0351*** 0.0218*** 0.0361*** 
∆R2 overall: the corresponding step vs step I  0.0141*** 0.0008*** 0.0151*** 
∆R2 overall: full model vs absorbed slack    0.001*** 
∆R2 overall: full model vs unabsorbed slack    0.0143*** 
Panel C: Dependent variable sales growth     
R2 overall 0.0933*** 0.1593*** 0.1267*** 0.1738*** 
∆R2 overall: the corresponding step vs step I  0.066*** 0.0334*** 0.0805*** 
∆R2 overall: full model vs absorbed slack    0.0145*** 
∆R2 overall: full model vs unabsorbed slack    0.0471*** 
 





Table 7 Fixed effects estimations for the influence of slack on future performance (average three-
year ahead performance), correcting for endogeneity (two-stages least squares estimator). Standard 
errors in parentheses. 









Absorbed slack    
INVSL: Inventory slack -0.151*** -0.0650*** 0.0302*** 
 (0.00691) (0.00500) (0.00238) 
INVSL2 0.000622 0.00587*** -0.00222** 
 (0.00295) (0.00213) (0.00101) 
PPESL: PPE slack -0.198*** -0.0819*** 0.137*** 
 (0.00893) (0.00646) (0.00337) 
PPESL2 0.0220*** 0.00687*** -0.0221*** 
 (0.00330) (0.00239) (0.00118) 
SGASL: SGA slack -0.236*** -0.0793*** 0.0472*** 
 (0.00830) (0.00600) (0.00290) 
SGASL2 -0.0163*** -0.00978*** -0.00379*** 
 (0.00371) (0.00269) (0.00130) 
Unabsorbed slack    
FINSL: financial slack 0.0373*** 0.0156*** -0.0294*** 
 (0.00633) (0.00458) (0.00221) 
FINSL2 0.00113 -0.00775*** -0.00470*** 
 (0.00322) (0.00233) (0.00112) 
EQDSL: equity slack -0.0544*** -0.0543*** -0.0312*** 
 (0.00898) (0.00650) (0.00314) 
EQDSL2 0.00103 0.0109*** 0.00894*** 
 (0.00281) (0.00203) (0.000976) 
CASHSL: cash slack -0.0583*** -0.00752 -0.000794 
 (0.00965) (0.00698) (0.00330) 
CASHSL2 -0.0147*** -0.00599*** -8.44e-06 
 (0.00297) (0.00214) (0.00101) 
Control variables    
Mean three-year ahead sales growth 2.624*** 1.034***  
 (0.0441) (0.0319)  
logASS: size 0.0831*** -0.0283*** -0.0143*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0104) (0.00463) 
Mean three-year ahead investment in 
PPE 
  0.425*** 
   (0.00522) 
Dummies for years Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.153*** 0.0797*** 0.0287** 
 (0.0374) (0.0270) (0.0120) 
    
R2 0.1836*** 0.0583*** 0.3055*** 
Number of firms 1,419 1,419 1,416 
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Observations 30,243 30,228 28,823 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels based on two-
tailed tests, respectively. ROA is return on assets; ROE return on equity; S sales; INVSL inventory 
slack; PPESL property, plant and equipment slack; SGASL selling, general and administrative 
expenses slack; FINSL financial slack; EQDSL equity-to-debt slack; CASHSL cash slack; ASS total 
assets, and PPE property, plant and equipment. 
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Table 8 Summary of slack relationships between slack and three-year ahead performance (with data from Table 6) 




















% of the 
variable 
distribution) 
Position of inflection 
point 
Relationship for 
most range values 
Panel A: Mean three-year ahead return on assets      
INVSL −  Linear ---- ---- ---- ---- Negative linear 
PPESL − + U-shaped Minimum 4.489579 > 99.99 % Outside range Negative convex 
SGASL − − Inverted U-shaped Maximum -7.243617 < 0.01 % Outside range Negative concave 
FINSL +  Linear ---- ---- ---- ---- Positive linear 
EQDSL −  Linear ---- ---- ---- ---- Negative linear 
CASHSL − − Inverted U-shaped Maximum -1.9772238 < 0.01 % Outside range Negative concave 
Panel B: mean three-year ahead return on equity      
INVSL − + U-shaped Minimum 5.5371641 > 99.99 % Outside range Negative convex 
PPESL − + U-shaped Minimum 5.9579112 > 99.99 % Outside range Negative convex 
SGASL − − Inverted U-shaped Maximum -4.0532719 <0.01% Outside range Negative concave 
FINSL + − Inverted U-shaped Maximum 1.0058825 > 88.2% Outside range2 Positive concave 
EQDSL − + U-shaped Minimum 2.0502243 > 97.2% Inside range3 Negative convex 
CASHSL  − Inverted U-shaped Maximum -0.6276959 <0.01% Outside range Negative concave 
Panel C: Mean three-year ahead sales growth      
INVSL + −** Inverted U-shaped Maximum 6.8105654 > 99.99 % Outside range Positive concave 
PPESL + − Inverted U-shaped Maximum 3.116566 > 98.4 % Inside range2 Positive concave 
SGASL + − Inverted U-shaped Maximum 6.2176262 > 99.99 % Outside range Positive convex 
FINSL − − Inverted U-shaped Maximum -3.1263414 < 0.01 % Outside range Negative concave 
EQDSL − + U-shaped Minimum 1.7456008 > 95.2 % Inside range3 Negative convex 
CASHSL  − Inverted U-shaped Maximum -47.020142 <99.99% Outside range Negative concave 
 
Notes: 1: All signs are significant at p<0.01, with the exception of those with ** (significant at p<0.05). ROA is return on assets; ROE return on equity; S 
sales; INVSL inventory slack; PPESL property, plant and equipment slack; SGASL selling, general and administrative expenses slack; FINSL financial 
slack; EQDSL equity-to-debt slack, and CASHSL cash slack. 2: The inflection point is inside the variable range, but the 95% Fieller interval of the 
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extreme point is outside the range. The U-test for the slope in the upper or lower bound is significant at p<0.1. 3: The U-test for the slope in the upper 





Fig. 1.A Linear plot with coefficients for estimation of Eq. 1 without squared terms: ROA = -
0.0144048 ∙ EQDSL 
 
 
Fig. 1.B Curvilinear plot with coefficients for estimation of Eq. 1 with squared terms (see 
column A in Table 4): ROA = 0.0390179 ∙ EQDSL -0.0222177 ∙ EQDSL2 
 
  










































Fig. 1 Plots of standardized one-year ahead return on assets depending on standardized values 
of equity slack and histogram of standardized values of equity slack.  
 
 
 
